agricultural research range, conservatively, from us$5 billion to us$9 billion per year. Even though exact monetary and animal use data are unobtainable, in this chapter I use the best available, if imprecise, estimates. The estimates themselves are arguable, yet the underlying conclusions remain valid.
2

Biomedical Animal Research
Animal experiments are of two types: basic ( e.g., investigation of biological phenomena and animal models) and applied ( e.g., drug research and devel opment (R&D) , and toxicity and safety testing). Applied research can also be preclinical ( e.g., molecular biology, cell culture, animal models) or clinical ( e.g., human drug or vaccine efficacy trials) . The preclinical research goal in animal experimentation is to generate candidate drugs, bio-medical technol ogy or devices and diagnostic tests to evaluate downstream for clinical test ing and possibly commercialization, a laboratory-to-patient process called translation. Preclinical research also entails toxicity testing of drugs, vaccines, chemicals, cosmetics, and other consumer products, usually in mice and dogs. Veterinary biomedical animal research is structured essentially the same as its human counterpart albeit on a much smaller scale. The desired outcome of preclinical research, mostly performed by government and academia, are sci entific papers, the currency ( along with grant funds) of research success. The desired outcome of applied research, mostly performed by biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms, are patented biomedical products that reflect successful translation and new revenue streams. Public acceptance of animal research, especially if invasive and painful, is contingent on substantial human benefits andfiscalaccountability. Unfortunately, taxpayers often support animal research under the false h yp e of "breakthrough" animal model-based medical progress.
Most preclinical research is publicly funded. The us National Institutes of Health (NIH), the world's largest biomedical research organization with a 2019 budget of us$39.2 billion, emphasizes infectious diseases and oncology (NIH, 2019 ) . The biotechnology and pharmaceutical sectors favor product develop ment and commercialization ( e.g., bio-engineered drugs, vaccines and clinical trials for cancer, analgesics, anti-diabetic drugs, and some rare diseases) . The public sector generally relies more on animals than the private sector. How ever, the private sector depends indirectly on publicly funded animal research as a pipeline for candidate drugs or technologies to convert into marketable biomedical products (Dorsey et al., 2009; Moses et al., 2015) .
Tax-supported animal research and testing is conducted or sponsored by several us agencies, especially the NIH. Federal laws mandate animal testing of pharmaceuticals, vaccines, and other chemicals to assess their safety and efficacy. The Environmental Protection Agency and the Food and Drug Ad ministration (FDA) are appropriated vast funds for animal testing. Other us agencies that require and/or conduct animal testing include the Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the Depart ment of Defense, the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, and the Department of Transportation. The private sector has decreased ani mal testing in some areas, especially in pharmaceuticals ( due to high cost and animal model failure) and in cosmetics ( due to consumer pressure). However, millions of animals are still used annually by private industry for internal or regulatory safety and efficacy testing of agrochemicals, vaccines and other bio logics, and chemicals in consumer products (61.8%; us$71 billion) . Private in dustry is followed by the us government (31.5%; us$45 billion) nonprofits and charities (3.8%; us$4.4 billion), and academia (3.0%; us$3.5 billion) . About us$56, 4 billion (49°/o) is spent on preclinical research, with the NIH providing most funding. About 47°/o of preclinical research uses animals, of which 51% to 89% is flawed. Thus, us$14 billion to us$25 billion (g million to 15 million out of 17 million laboratory animals) of us animal research is wasted (Freed man, Cockburn and Simcoe, 201s; Moses et al., 201s; National Anti-Vivisection Society, 2018) .
2.1
Ma ny Animals
Precise animal numbers utilized in us biomedical research are unknown be cause the large majority ( at least 95%) are exempt from the monitoring, care, and reporting requirements of the USDA's Animal Welfare Act (AwA). Mice, rats, birds, and fish are exempt. As a result, it is impossible to know how many mice and rats are used each year for research in the us, for what purposes, and the pain and/ or distress these animals experience because this data is not gathered or reported (American Anti-Vivisection Society, 2017) . The USDA re ported 820,812 AWA-covered animal species used for research, testing, teach ing, and experimentation in 2016. About 40% of these animals were reported to be subjected to painful procedures, some with and some without anesthe sia or analgesia (USDA, 2017). However, this USDA AWA data (animal numbers, species, painful procedures, etc.) is facility self-reported and thus unverified.
It is estimated that roughly 95% of the animals used in us laboratories are mice and rats. Assuming relative species use comparability of European Union data on vertebrate animals (i.e., mice, rats, birds, fish, and all cold-blooded animals) , and an AWA non-exempt research animal population of 821,000, about 16 million mice are used annually. However, the estimated us research mouse population varies between 10 million and 100 million animals, many Kathrin Herrmann and Kimberley Jayne -978-90-04-39119-2 Downloaded from Brill.com11 /11 /2019 09:57:0BPM via free access genetically engineered (Guarino, 2015) . Mouse numbers are growing rapidly (Goodman, Chandna and Roe, 2015) . Extrapolation from Goodman, Chandna and Roe's study estimates the us research mouse population at 86 million.
2.2
The Biomedical Industrial Com p lex The biomedical industrial complex is an international multi-billion-dollar business. Animal experimentation in the biomedical industrial complex ( BI c) is pervasive, secretive, profitable, and government-sanctioned. The term "in dustrial complex" is from the famous and prescient 1961 farewell speech by us President Dwight Eisenhower to "beware the military industrial complex", the semi-opaque, complicated "dark state" network of relationships between governments, the armed forces and the corporate military/security sector that supplies them. Like the military industrial complex, the biomedical in dustrial complex is an impenetrable, taxpayer-money driven eco-system, where the stated bio-medical and public health missions are sometimes sub servient to more self-serving ones ( Orzechowski, 2012 ) . This does not impugn or discredit most animal researchers, who usually have good, if misguided, intentions.
There are innumerable inter-dependent BIC beneficiaries. These include millions of investigators ( salaries, prestige) , thousands of universities and foundations ( overhead, patents, jobs) , hundreds of funding organizations (jobs, power) , numerous biotechnology and pharmaceutical corporations (jobs, profits, patents, products) and venture capitalists (return on investment, ROI). Moreover, there is a vast subtler army of allied industries ( e.g., equip ment, reagent and animal suppliers, consultants, bureaucrats, veterinarians, regulators, and publishers) .
Like all taxpayer subsidized enterprises affiliated with human medicine, prices for products and services are highly inflated. Animal suppliers breed animals, from genetically engineered mice to monkeys, to satisfy researcher demands. A New Zealand white rabbit can cost us$350, a monkey us$8,ooo. In 2010, the Jackson Laboratory sold 2.9 million mice for a revenue of us$98.7 million. Suppliers of feed, cages, and equipment have profitable businesses. A mouse treadmill may cost us$10,ooo. The us scientific publishing industry gen erates us$10 billion in annual revenue Qarvis and Williams, 2016) . Biomedical research, with or without animals, is particularly lucrative for us universities who charge overhead ( facilities and administrative fees) on every research dol lar, typically at a 50% rate. About 80% (us$29.8 billion/year) The cornerstone of modem biomedical investigation is animal experimen tation, but this practice is in the midst of an existential crisis. Up to 88% of preclinical biomedical experiments, especially those involving animals, are in valid, i.e. derived candidate drugs or vaccines are clinically ineffective or toxic (Freedman et al., 2015; Bock, 2016) . This results from poor experimental practic es intertwined with the abject failure of synthetic disease in animals, from mice to chimpanzees, to serve as more than skin-deep human disease surrogates. Animal research has always been ethically contested, but there is now indis putable evidence of animal model failure to recapitulate human disease and pro vide clinical value (Pound and Blaug, 2016) . Public support for animal research is dropping. From 2009 to 2014, Americans opposing animal use in scientific re search increased from 43°/o to 50% (Pew Research Center, 2015) . Failed animal models are the root cause of disappointing and diminishing returns on biomedi cal investments. Poorly designed preclinical animal studies lead to downstream expensive but fruitless clinical trials, exposing people to false hopes, potentially harmful drugs, or withheld beneficial treatments. Poorly conducted studies pro duce unreliable findings and suffering in millions of animals, nullifying the so cial and moral justification oflaboratory animal use (Pound and Bracken, 2014 ) .
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Failure and Waste in Preclinical Animal Research
.1
Of Mice Not Men: Animals Are Not Peo p le Hundreds of thousands of peer-reviewed publications are based on the as sumption that human-animal similarities enable knowledge from "animal Kathrin Herrmann and Kimberley Jayne -978-90-04-39119-2 Downloaded from Brill.com11 /11 /2019 09:57:0BPM via free access models" to be extrapolated to people. The belief is entrenched in scientific funding agencies and animal experimentalists. However, even if animal re search is conducted faultlessly, animal models have limited success in pre dicting human clinical outcomes because of inherent evolutionary, genomic, epi-genomic, physiological, and other human-animal differences. Human dis eases are artificially induced in animals but fail to reproduce the complexity of human ailments. Animal models are typically generated through genetic ma nipulation, surgical intervention, or injection of foreign substances, produc ing ailments with signs similar to a human disease. A common current mouse cancer model harvests human tumor cells, grows them in a petri dish and then transplants tumor tissue beneath the skin of immuno-compromised mice, so that the mice avatars cannot reject the implanted tumors. These so-called patient-derived xenografts are then exposed to drugs whose killing efficiency and toxicity profiles are extrapolated to treat "personalized" human cancers. The cancer research community published an extraordinary 361,693 experi mental studies and journal papers according to a PubMed database search I conducted on 8 August 2018 using the terms "Mice" and "Cancer". PubMed was unable to identify how many successful anti-cancer mouse drugs became FDA approved for human use but that number is certainly miniscule. Billions oflost dollars clearly show that mice as human disease surrogates are no more analo gous than artificially flavored grape drink is to fine French wine. The chimpan zee, who shares 99% of its DNA sequence with humans and should best predict human outcomes, has largely failed as an animal model, certainly in dozens of HIV vaccine trials over the past three decades (Bailey, 2008) . A 1% DNA differ ence apparently outweighs a 99% similarity.
Irreproducibility
Science has two aims: to be reproducible ( confirmatory) and to contribute to cumulative knowledge ( discovery). Confirmatory science has higher value be cause it defines scientific truth, i.e. the non-repeatable is false. An estimated 51% to 89% of preclinical animal research (us$13.3 billion to us$23 billion) is unreliable ( see Table 10 .1 ). About 1.5 million biomedical scientific papers are published per year. Irreproducible but published animal research constitutes severe literature pol lution, leading other researchers to follow false leads, amplifying waste (see Figure 10 .1 ).
Some cogent and expensive examples of non-repeatable animal experi ments are shown in Table 10 .2. billion d Probably an overestimate, as industry has a downstream clinical research focus and relies much less on upstream animal research than government or academia. e Since animal models are rarely used or needed in agricultural animal research, total basic research and total animal research dollars are assumed to be the same.
The most alarming exemplar of irreproducibility is a 2012 Amgen study that reproduced key findings in only six of 53 ( n % ) landmark preclinical cancer papers, mostly from mouse models, published in premier scientific journals (Begley and Ellis, 2012 ) . NIH director Francis Collins recently wrote, "A growing chorus of concern, from scientists and laypeople, contends that the complex system for ensuring the reproducibility of biomedical research is failing and is in need of restructuring [ ... ] Preclinical research, especially work that uses animal models, seems to be the area that is cu"ently most susceptible to repro ducibility issues" ( emphasis added, Collins and Tabak, 2014 ) . Why do we contin ue to spend so much on flawed animal models that lack validity, resilience, and repeatability?
Non-publishable Research and Publication Bias
A h yp othesized treatment in an animal model may be ineffective or toxic, a "failure" considered a "negative result". Scientists do not want to submit, and peer reviewed biomedical journal within 30 months of trial completion. Fur thermore, those that were published omitted key, usually detrimental, details (Ross et al., 2012) . A 2016 study of 4347 interventional clinical trials across 51 us academic medical centers reported dissemination of results within 24 months of completion ranging from 16.2% to 55.3%. This occurred in spite of a 2008 (unenforced) federal law requiring reporting of clinical trial results within 12 months of completion or termination with a (never applied) $10,000 per day fine for non-compliance (Chen et al., 2016) . My current home insti tution, the University of Nebraska, is the most flagrant violator of clinical trial reporting among academic institutions, disclosing less than 20% of clini cal trial findings from (Pillar and Bronshtein, 2018 The history of cancer research has been a history of curing cancer in the mouse. We have cured mice of cancer for decades and it simply didn't work in humans. We need to acknowledge the fact that use of animals will not make us better scientists, but bitter scientists.
RICHARD KLAUSNER, former director of the us National Cancer Institute, 1998, in MANDAL and PARIJA, 2013
As the above quote attests, animal model failure has been well known for decades at the highest levels. Animal experiments have contributed to understanding mechanisms of disease and normal animal physiology and bio chemistry. However, their record in predicting effectiveness, toxicity of treat ment, or preventive strategies in human trials is dismal. In fact, clinical trials are essential precisely because animal studies do not predict with sufficient certainty what will happen in people (van der Worp et al., 2010 ) . The pharma ceutical industry bemoans the near empty pipeline over the past 30 years of new drugs that enter and survive the clinical trial gauntlet to gain FDA approv al Serious biases in animal studies makes it nearly impossible to rely on animal data to predict whether or not an intervention will be toxic or have a favorable clinical benefit-risk ratio in humans (Ioannidis, 2012) . Excessive translational risk occurs even though there has never been more public and private money, trained researchers, and better infrastructure, facilities, and biotechnological tools ( e.g., "humanized" mice) than at present. Nearly all candidate drugs de rived from preclinical research, entailing immense expenditures and use of animal models in which the drugs work well against artificially-induced dis ease, fail in human trials (Kaur, Sidhu and Singh, 2016 Seok et al., 2013 Perrin, 2014 Petrov et al., 2017 operating procedure to validate drug targets and initiate internal drug dis covery. Non-repeatable results have been disappointing and expensive (see Table 10 .2 ). The pharmaceutical industry has heavily divested and decreased reliance on animals because each translational failure causes significant losses of invested capital. European drug companies decreased animal use by 25°/o from 2005 to 2008 (Pound and Bracken, 2014 ) . Fa lse positive animal model success: Industry researchers must give up when a drug is poorly absorbed, unsafe, or does not work. Only five in 5,000 com pounds that enter preclinical testing make it to human testing. Only one of the five is safe and effective enough to be marketed (FDA, 2017) . More than go% of promising new compounds fail when tested in humans because they are ineffective or toxic, even though each drug performed well in prior multi-species animal tests.
-Fa lse negative toxicity (iatro-epidemics): Severe unintended human harms and billions of dollars in damages occur when FDA-approved drugs are non-toxic in laboratory animals but cause serious, sometimes fatal iatro ( medically caused) epidemics after marketplace entry. These adverse drug reactions m ay cause 100,000 us deaths annually, although this is likely a highly inflated number (Lazarou, Pomeranz and Corey, 1998) . The FDA Adverse Events Reporting System (FAERS) is a computerized information database designed to support the agency's post-marketing safety surveil lance program for all approved drug and therapeutic biologic products. The FAE RS contains almost 16 million reports of adverse events and reflects data from 1969 to 2018 1 suggesting limitations to the validity of animal drug or biologics toxicity screening (FDA, 2018) . For example: -The arthritis drug rofecoxib (Vioxx) was safe in eight studies in African green monkeys and five other animal species but caused 140,000 heart at tacks and 60,000 to 100,000 deaths before withdrawal in 2004. Merck paid us$950 million to settle damages in 2011 (Pippin, 2012) . -Analysis of 780 chemical agents listed in a cancer database found the positive predictivity of animal bioassays, for a definite or probable hu man carcinogen, to be 20% (Knight, 2007 ) . In addition to risking human welfare from the low predictability of animal bioassays, each ass ay re quires up to millions of dollars and years to execute (Akhtar, 2015) . -The diet drug, fen-phen (fenfluramine-phentermine), worked well as an appetite suppressant in rats without toxicity. However, this popular drug damaged heart valves and caused pulmonary hypertension in some people in the 1990s. The FDA withdrew it in 1997. The drug's maker settled damage claims for us$3.75 billion (Kolata, 1997; Morrow, 1999) . -Fa lse positive drug toxicity: Just as ineffective and dangerous drugs are ap proved based on erroneous safety in animals, useful drugs m ay be toxic in animals but safe for people. Aspirin was patented in 1900, decades before mandated animal testing. When later evaluated, aspirin produced birth defects in mice, rats, guinea pigs, rabbits, cats, dogs, sheep, and monkeys. Post-approval toxicity of penicillin (killed guinea pigs) and tamoxifen (liver cancer in rats) was absent in people. If the animal toxicity were known, these safe drugs would unlikely be on the market tod ay (Akhtar, 2015 (Akhtar, 2015) . Phase transition success rates are: Phase I to Phase 11: 63%; Phase II to Phase 111: 31%; Phase 111 to new drug approval: 85%. The overall success rate from Phase I to FDA approval is 9 .6% (Batelle, 2015) . The immense attrition of drugs entering human clinical trials has made big pharma cautious, even skeptical, of preclinical animal research. In 2013, the average time and cost to develop a new drug was 10 years and us$2.6 billion (Batelle, 2015) . Candidate drugs that fail anywhere in the clinical trial process, prior to FDA-approval, still lose millions of dollars. Drug development losses are recouped as higher prices for pharmaceuticals already on the market. Promising preclinical animal studies that require extensive time, labor, and money rarely translate into successful human therapies. The overwhelming preclinical tendency to use animal models, in spite of their near universal translation failure, invokes the "law of the hammer", a cognitive bias involv ing over-reliance on a familiar tool (Kaplan, 1964) . Abraham Maslow (1966) said, "I suppose it is tempting, if the only tool you have is a hammer, to treat everything as if it were a nail". The laboratory mouse is certainly a worn-out bio-hammer. (Clancy, Fuglie and Heisey, 2016 ) (see (Twine, 2012 ) . The dominant raison d'etre of live stock research is to benefit people via support of the industrial ("factory farm" or "prison") paradigm, i.e. intensively managed and densely confined pigs, feedlot beef cattle, dairy cattle, and poultry (Imhoff, 2010 ) . There are three common aims: -To optimize so called production effi ciency of meat, milk and eggs i.e. generate the greatest output with the fewest inputs. Three tools accomplish this: ge netic selection, feed efficiency and animal health, writ large, including growth promoting drugs, disease suppressing antibiotics and numerous vaccines.
To maximize consumption of animal agriculture products.
To address unintended consequences of industrial animal agriculture ( e.g., food safety risk, zoonotic pathogens, antibiotic resistance, and pollution from animal wastes). Because feed is the greatest expense in raising livestock ( 65%-75°/o of total cost), there is an ongoing quest to lower feed costs. A dominant research goal is to increase feed efficiency (feed inputs/outputs of growth, eggs or milk). Feed efficiency research focuses on: ( 1) drugs (hormones and antibiotics); ( 2) genetic selection;
(3) better nutrition; and (4) low cost "waste products" as feedstuffs.
While com and soybeans are mainstays in us industrialized livestock ra tions, less savory ingredients also become animal feeds, especially to meet expensive protein needs. Only 60% of a slaughtered cow is edible (i.e. suit able as human food). The remaining "inedible" 40% (including hides, bones, entrails, lungs, spleens, hooves, fat and gristle, and fetuses, among others) , known euphemistically as "by-products", are not permitted to be used as human food. They can, however, be used in livestock and poultry feeds and pet foods. Rendering plants transform slaughter by-products and animals that are unsuitable for human consumption into animal feed products using grinding, cooking, and pressing processes. Livestock are fed rendered animal fat and pro tein from slaughtered food animals and their wastes, including chicken feath ers, egg shells, poultry litter (bedding and feces), blood, hair, bone marrow, pig manure, and rumen ingesta. So called " 4D" animals ( dead, dying, diseased, disabled) also become livestock feed and pet foods. Cost driven same-species feeding ( cannibalism) is common and industry-supported in livestock and poultry in most countries (Denton et al., 2005) .
Meat and bone meal (MEM, dried and ground) , also known as "animal flour", was a small-scale livestock feed for much of the twentieth century. The Ag ricultural Research Service, the internal USDA research arm, studied feeding bovine MEM to dairy cattle in the 1960s (Brundage and Sweetman, 1963) . How ever, commercial rendering, industry-sponsored research at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, in the early 1980s, discovered the "by-pass protein effect" when cattle are fed high protein MEM from dead cattle (Rampton and Stauber, 1997) . Proteins from rendered bovine MEM, unlike plant proteins, withstand rumen microbial digestion and are delivered intact to the small intestine, max imizing growth and lactation in high-yield dairy cattle. Additional University sponsored research confirmed the MEM by-pass protein effect, resulting in many peer-reviewed papers ( e.g., Stock et al., 1981; Santos et al., 1998) . It should be no surprise that rumen microbes, evolutionarily designed over millions of years to digest forage, are unable to digest MEM, completely foreign nutrients. By analogy, humans would have a difficult time digesting sawdust. By the mid-198os, MEM b yp ass protein was widely accepted, especially in Western Europe, as a dairy cattle protein source. MEM use in animal feed was heavily dependent on its price relative to the price of alternative ingredients ( e.g., soybeans) with similar nutrient values.
However, this anti-nature Faustian bargain of high milk production in ex change for cannibalism resulted, starting in the mid-198os, in the bovine spon giform encephalopathy (ESE, "Mad Cow") pandemic. This new fatal prion (infectious protein) disease spread to cattle eating prion-contaminated bovine MEM, amplified by "recycling" rendered cattle that died of ESE into even more prion-contaminated MEM. In Britain, 185,000 live cattle were ESE-infected, 4-4 million were slaughtered during the 1986-1998 eradication program, and perhaps a million ESE-infected cattle entered the human food chain. Cattle in 30 countries were infected. Thousands of European dairy farmers lost their livelihoods (Brown et al., 2001) . Since the 1996 discovery that ESE was trans missible to humans from eating prion-contaminated beef, at least 231 persons in 13 countries died from new variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (nvCJD), the zoonotic manifestation of ESE (Maheshwari et al., 2015) . Since the first us ESE case in 2003, the us cattle industry has forfeited billions of dollars from lost exports, decreased product value, lower consumption, and new regulatory bur dens. This tragic MEM cow cannibalism story shows that "production efficien cy" research can have incredible negative sequelae and vividly demonstrates Thus, in addition to its multi-million dollar federal research budget, MARC performs targeted research on behalf of, or funded by, livestock commod ity groups. For example, the National Cattlemen's Beef Association (NCBA), a trade association and lobbying group for mostly large us beef producers and slaughter processors, has a very close and decades-long association with MARC. The NCBA funded at least 52 research projects at MARC between 1999 and 2017. These included one project in genetic selection, nine in meat quality, and 42 in beef safety (zoonotic bacteria and antibiotic resistance). Each NCBA proposal typically provides funding of us$100,ooo for one year and does not cover MARC labor or equipment costs. Thus, this represents a us$5.2 million NCBA research investment in MARC over 18 years (National Cattlemen's Beef Association, 2017) . However, since MARC provides "free" labor (~80% of the cost of research), this $5.2 million industry "investment" in MARC signifies a taxpayer gift of at least $20.8M to the N c BA over 18 years, an impressive return in investment. The North American Meat Institute, a meat and poultry trade association representing meat packers and processors is also a frequent funder of industry research at MARC.
MARC's mission is to apply science and technology for red meat production effi ciency to benefit consumers, producers, and animal agri-business, with a genetic selection focus. Among livestock producers, animal scientists, and beef geneticists, MARC is a world-famous, NIH-Mayo Clinic equivalent for red meat livestock R&D. Like all industrial livestock based-systems, MARC achieves "pro duction efficiency" using three tools: -Genetic selection: Choose a desirable and heritable production trait ( e.g., many offspring; large muscles) and vigorously (hyper) select for this attri bute over many generations. -Fe ed effi ciency: Maximize via genetic selection and/or experimental low cost feeds. For example, in the early 1980s, MARC scientists fed high pH cement kiln dust ( a by-product of cement manufacturing) to feedlot steers, sheep, and pigs as a calcium feed supplement and to buffer the danger ously acidic rumen or stomach pH of animals fed high-energy com ra tions (Wheeler et al., 1981; Pond et al., 1982) . Cement kiln dust is the fine grained, solid, highly alkaline waste removed from cement kiln exhaust gas by air pollution control devices. Toxicity led to abandonment of these experiments. -"Factory fa rm-acology": Use drugs to improve feed efficiency and promote fast lean growth, such as anabolic steroids (hormone implants), antibiot ics, ionophores, and beta-agonists (repartitioning agents that convert fat to muscle) (Petersen, 2012 ) . The cumulative drug effects are rapid growth and maximized lean muscle mass. As a cogent example of MARC funding of industry research, USDA and UNL investigated the growth and "welfare" (body temperature and mobility) ef fects of zilpaterol, a beta-agonist growth promotant, on MARC feedlot steers (Boyd et al., 2015) . Zilpaterol is a failed human asthma drug whose undesirable human side effect of turning fat into muscle was a very desirable outcome in cattle. This drug is approved for use in livestock in only five countries ( Centner, Alvey and Stelzleni, 2014 
Conclusions
Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial dis eases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.
LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, 1914
It is an economic and ethical imperative to reduce wasted money and ani mals used in us biomedical and agricultural animal research. These impera tives are unlikely to manifest in the current animal research environment due to perverse incentives. Complete transparency ( e.g., costing, specific animal usage, outcomes, evidence of translational success, mandatory public re porting of all government funded research regardless of results) in both the public and private domains will likely be the most effective driver of fiscal responsibility and refining (minimizing experimental suffering), reducing (minimizing animal numbers), and replacing (with non-animal alternatives) research animal use. This will require, at a minimum, sustained public pres sure, policy and regulatory changes ( e.g., removal of species or institutional exemptions from the AWA), adequate resourcing, and enforced (new or old) legislation. Animal research is losing its immunity from criticism or challenge. How ever, it is a multi-billion-dollar industry in which government, academia and private business have high financial stakes (Pound and Bracken, 2014) . It is critical to recognize that wasted money in animal research is only germane to laboratory animals and to people excluded from the animal research in dustrial complex (i.e., taxpayers, patients, investors, and consumers) . To those within the animal research ecosystems, there is no waste or cost, only suste nance and benefit. This is a major reason why wasteful, unproductive, and even counterproductive use of research animals not only continues but is fiercely defended despite obvious limitations and dangers. Supporters of animal re search rely on expert opinion ( one of the least valid types of evidence) and the occasional translational success story. Opponents have billions of wasted dollars, millions of scientific papers, and decades of evidence against their continued use. Government sponsored animal experiments may continue be cause they are taxpayer-subsidized and incentivized. The pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries may reduce laboratory animal use in drug discovery and development, because they cannot invest heavily in such an unreliable methodology. Unfortunately, scientific precedent, legal liability concerns, and regulatory approval mandates will ensure enormous use of laboratory animals in the private sector to assess safety of drugs, medical devices, biologics, chem icals, and consumer products and to test vaccines (for potency and by batch), at least in the near term or until regulatory requirements change.
Available and emerging non-animal research approaches and technologies can provide better return on investment, more valid and valuable findings, and better human well-being outcomes and save billions of taxpayer dollars and millions of animal lives (D'Urbino, 2016) . Goals should include: -Abandoning molecular reductionism ( e.g., as manifested in genetically modified or "gene knock out" mice). -Investigating complex naturally-occurring disease in humans and animals instead of artificial and incongruent animal models.
-Implementing more in vitro (human or animal cell-based assays) and in silico ( computer modeling) technologies. -Resourcing development, validation, and regulatory acceptance of non animal alternatives ( e.g., the Interagency Coordinating Committee on the Validation of Alternative Methods, ICCVAM (National Toxicology Program, 2018 )).
-Defunding public biomedical research that uses animal disease models.
-Eliminating non-competitive internal government research funding and halving extramural grant overhead rates. -Discontinuing the failed research focus in agriculture on industrial live stock "production efficiency" in favor of humane sustainable agricultural research.
